Reexamining the significance proposition for CompetencyBased Medical Schooling

During the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic takeaway food orders generally increased, yet sales of Chinese and Italian food declined. At this time, news sources ran stories on the safety of cuisine from these countries, frequently juxtaposed with communications on mortality-related information related to the virus. Terror management theory suggests mortality concerns can lead people to defend against the psychological threat of death by bolstering positive evaluations of products and values of their own culture, and by disparaging products and values of other cultures. This translates to food preferences, with death reminders heightening consumption of food from one's own (vs. others') culture. However, whether this extends to food safety perceptions has not yet been probed. In the present experimental study, we examine whether death reminders (vs. a control topic) led U.S. participants to view American takeaway food as safer to consume, relative to Chinese and Italian food. Results indicate that across conditions, American food was evaluated as safer relative to Chinese and Italian takeout. https://www.selleckchem.com/products/ox04528.html Further, American takeaway was seen as safer after mortality reminders (vs. a control topic), with no differences in safety evaluations for Chinese or Italian takeout. Results are discussed in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic.Vaccinations remain a critical, albeit surprisingly controversial, health behavior, especially with the promise of widely available COVID-19 vaccine. Intellectual humility, a virtue characterized by nonjudgmental recognition of one's own intellectual fallibility, may counter rigidity associated with anti-vaccination attitudes and help promote vaccine-related behaviors. This study investigated whether intellectual humility is related to anti-vaccination attitudes and intentions to vaccinate against COVID-19, and whether intellectual humility can predict unique variance in these outcomes beyond participant demographic and personal factors. Participants (N = 351, 57.23% male, mean age = 37.41 years, SD = 11.51) completed a multidimensional measure for intellectual humility, the anti-vaccination attitudes (VAX) scale, and a two-item COVID-19 vaccination intention scale. Bivariate correlations demonstrated that intellectual humility was negatively related with anti-vaccination attitudes overall, r(349) = -.46, p less then .001, and positively related to intentions to vaccinate against COVID-19, r(349) = .20, p less then .001. Hierarchical multiple regression revealed that intellectual humility predicted all four types anti-vaccination attitudes, overall anti-vaccination attitudes, and COVID-19 vaccination intentions above and beyond demographic and personal factors (i.e., sex, race/ethnicity, age, education, socioeconomic status, and political orientation), ΔR 2 between .08 and .18, ps less then .001. These results bolster intellectual humility as a malleable psychological factor to consider in efforts to combat anti-vaccination attitudes and promote COVID-19 vaccination uptake.Across three studies, we investigated who expresses concern for COVID-19, or coronavirus, and engages in behaviors that are consistent with slowing the spread of COVID-19. In Studies 1 and 2 (n = 415, n = 199), those with warmer feelings toward scientists were more concerned and engaged in greater COVID-preventative behaviors, regardless of partisanship. That is, an anti-scientists bias was related to lessened concern and toward less preventive behaviors. Furthermore, those who were the most optimistic about hydroxychloroquine, a purported but unproven treatment against the virus, were less likely to engage in behaviors designed to decrease the spread of COVID-19. In Study 3 (n = 259), asking participants to watch a scientist discuss hydroxychloroquine on Fox News led people to greater endorsement of COVID behaviors. In short, positive feelings toward scientists, rather than political attitudes or knowledge, related to who was concerned and those willing to engage in pandemic reducing behaviors. These behaviors were not immutable and can be changed by scientific out-reach.Are disaster relief appeals more successful if they emphasize the material cost of disaster events in terms of economic damages and need for shelter, food, and health care, or if they emphasize the human cost in terms of psychological suffering and trauma caused? Although giving patterns seem to suggest that large-scale events that cause widespread material damage (e.g., the Asian Tsunami of 2004) are more successful at eliciting donations than smaller scaled events, it is argued that this pattern is explained by the fact that large perceived material damage leads to more perceived human suffering. In other words, it is the perceived human suffering which is the proximal driver of donations, rather than the material damage itself. Therefore, relief appeals that emphasize the human cost of events are more successful at eliciting donations than appeals that emphasize the material cost of events. This was demonstrated in a study focusing on donations by British participants (N = 200) to the Syrian refugee crisis in 2020, a study focusing on donations by British participants to victims of severe weather events in Eastern and Southern Africa in 2020 (N = 210), and a study among British participants focusing on a fictitious event (N = 150).We adopt a novel identification strategy to examine the heterogeneous effects of Canada's COVID-19 economic shutdown on hours worked across the earnings distribution. Early labor-market analyses found that workers in the bottom of the earnings distribution experienced a much larger reduction in hours worked than workers in the top of the earnings distribution. Our analysis reveals a double liability of low-wage work during Canada's COVID-19 economic shutdown while workers in every quintile experienced a large reduction in hours on average, significant increases in hours were only present among workers in the bottom quintile. Implications for crisis income supports are discussed.Over the last two decades, scholars have pointed to the significance of the impact of extreme events on consumption, a prominent part of national economies. How does the COVID-19 epidemic influence consumption? Using high-frequency payment system panel data, we explicitly consider the individual consumption changes and the substitution effect between online and offline markets of multiple categories by constructing autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models and conducting regression analyses. The p value and regression coefficients of the substitution elasticity are used to estimate the changes and the substitution effects from the offline to the online channels. The results show that consumption saw a remarkable decline after the surge of COVID-19 in 2020 compared to 2019. Overall, online markets were more resilient than the offline markets and the substitution effects after the epidemic's outbreak between the online and offline markets were significant for one-third of the consumption categories.